|本期目录/Table of Contents|

[1].质量投机行为对投标的影响研究[J].武汉工程大学学报,2009,(01):83-85.
　SHAO Xiao shuang,QU Chen zhong,JU Yan zhong.The implication study of opportunism about quality on bidding[J].Journal of Wuhan Institute of Technology,2009,(01):83-85.
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质量投机行为对投标的影响研究()
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《武汉工程大学学报》[ISSN:1674-2869/CN:42-1779/TQ]

卷:
期数:
2009年01期
页码:
83-85
栏目:
资源与土木工程
出版日期:
2009-01-28

文章信息/Info

Title:
The implication study of opportunism about quality on bidding
文章编号:
16742869(2009)01008303
作者:
-
东北电力大学建筑工程学院，吉林 吉林 132012
Author(s):
SHAO Xiaoshuang; QU Chenzhong; JU Yanzhong
School of Project and Construction Engineering，Northeast Dianli University，Jilin 132012，China
关键词:
双寡头竞争; 博弈论; 承包商; 质量; 低价中标
Keywords:
duopoly; game theory; contractor; quality; the minimum price get the object
分类号:
F407.9
DOI:
-
文献标志码:
A
摘要:
通过两阶段的博弈分析，得出承包商在施工的过程中，实际的施工质量水平往往低于业主在招标文件中规定的施工质量水平；而在投标阶段，成包商往往根据对实际可采用的施工质量水平的预期，进行投标报价，从而在某些情况下，低价中标的招标机制中，高成本的承包商也可能中标.
Abstract:
In the text，an analytical framework was developed to investigate the implications of opportunism about quality on bidding. The model of twostagegame was built，and got that the level of quality in the building is a bit lower than asked by the tender in the contract. In the course of tending，bidders price their bid according the prospective quality of building. So in the mechanism of the minimum price get the object，the bidder who has the higher cost can also get the contract in some case.

参考文献/References:

［1］Dyer D，Kagel J H. Bidding in common value auctions：How the commercial construction industry corrects for the winners curse［J］. Manage Sci，1996，42（10）：14631475.
［2］Krishna Mochtar，David Arditi. Pricing strategy in the US construction industry［J］. Construction Management and Economics，2001，19：405415.
［3］Fang Dongping，Li Mingen，Li Yinshen, et al. Risks in Chinese Construction Market Constactors’ Perspective［J］.Journal of Construction Engineering and Management，2004，130（6）：853861.
［4］Griffis F H（Bud）. Bidding Strategy：Winning over Key Competitors［J］.Constr Eng Manage，1992，118（1）：151165.
［5］全国造价工程师执业资格考试培训教材编审委员会.建设工程技术与计量（土建工程部分）［M］.北京：中国计划出版社，2003:274.
［6］张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学［M］.上海：三联出版社，1996.

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　ZHOU Xuan,LIANG Yuqian,MEI Ming,et al.On the game theory and the construction of environmental inspection system[J].Journal of Wuhan Institute of Technology,2009,(01):83.
[3]邵晓双.质量因素对投标的影响[J].武汉工程大学学报,2008,(02):123.
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备注/Memo

备注/Memo:
收稿日期：20080911
作者简介：邵晓双（1978 ），男，吉林梨树人，助教授，硕士.研究方向：工程项目招投标.
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